


The Two Truths About Reality: The Perfection of Wisdom

Guide to the Good Life - Part 4

“ The two – conceptualization
and what is conceptualized –
are mutually interdependent.
All analysis is expressed by taking
recourse in common sense. ”



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Chapter Nine, Entitled “The Perfection of Wisdom”

I. The Two Truths About Reality

imaṃ parikaraṃ sarvaṃ prajñārthaṃ hi munirjagau |
tasmādutpādayetprajñāṃ duḥkhanivṛttikāṅkṣayā || 1 ||

**The Sage has taught this whole set of teachings in order to prepare us for wisdom.
So with a strong desire to end suffering, one should cultivate wisdom.**

saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaśca satyadvayamidaṃ matam |
buddheragocarastattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtirucyate || 2 ||

**Truth about reality is considered to be of two kinds – deceptive and ultimate. How
things really are is inaccessible to the intellect, for the intellect is said to be
deceptive.**

tatra loko dvidhā dr̥ṣṭo yogī prākṛtakastathā |
tatra prākṛtako loko yogilokena bādhyate || 3 ||

**Because of this, the world is seen to be divided into two camps: the deep
practitioners and the worldly. The perspective of the worldly is invalidated by that
of the deep practitioner.**

bādhyante dhīviśeṣeṇa yogino'pyuttarottariḥ |
dr̥ṣṭāntenobhayeṣṭena kāryārthamavicārataḥ || 4 ||

**Even among the deep practitioners, lower perspectives are invalidated by higher ones
because of differences in wisdom in cases where, regardless of the purpose, both
parties agree on the examples.**

lokena bhāvā dr̥śyante kalpyante cāpi tattvataḥ |
na tu māyāvadityatra vivādo yogilokayoh || 5 ||

**Worldly people see and conceptualize things as if they were real and not illusory,
and that's the point of disputation between the deep practitioners and the worldly.**

pratyakṣamapi rūpādi prasiddhyā na pramāṇataḥ |
aśucyādiṣu śucyādiprasiddhiriva sā mṛṣā || 6 ||

**Things like physical form, even though perceived directly with the senses, are
confirmed through consensus and not by means of valid perception. It's like the
consensus that says things are pure when they are impure, which is false.**

lokāvatāraṇārthaṁ ca bhāvā nāthena deśitāḥ |
tattvataḥ kṣaṇikā naite saṁvṛtyā cedvirudhyate | | 7 | |

The Lord taught that things exist for the purpose of dropping down to the level of the worldly. “If, from the point of view of how things really are, things don’t have even momentary existence, then this seems to contradict what’s been said about deceptive reality.”

na doṣo yogisaṁvṛtyā lokātte tattvadarśinaḥ |
anyathā lokabādhā syādaśucistrīnirūpaṇe | | 8 | |

There is no problem when it comes to deceptive reality among the deep practitioners. They, unlike the worldly, perceive things as they really are. Were it otherwise, when it came to the matter of the impurity of women, the worldly would invalidate their perspective.

māyopamājjinātpuṇyaṁ sadbhāve'pi kathaṁ yathā |
yadi māyopamaḥ sattvaḥ kiṁ punarjāyate mṛtaḥ | | 9 | |

“How could a Conqueror who is like an illusion produce merit, as opposed to one who truly exists? If a living being is like an illusion, what is it that is reborn after death?”

yāvatpratyaayasāmagrī tāvanmāyāpi vartate |
dirghasamtānamātreṇa kathaṁ sattvo'sti satyataḥ | | 10 | |

Even that which is illusory goes on for as long as there is a collection of conditions. Why should there be some kind of true reality to a living being just because of the long duration of his or her continuum?

māyāpuruṣaghātādau cittābhāvāna pāpakam |
cittamāyāsamete tu pāpapuṇyasamudbhavaḥ | | 11 | |

“There is no negative karma accruing from things like the killing of illusory persons who do not have truly existing minds.” But when there is the illusion of a mind, negative karma and merit arise.

mantrādīnāmasāmarthyānna māyācittasāmbhavaḥ |
sāpi nānāvidhā māyā nānāpratayayasāmbhavā |
naikasya sarvasāmarthyam pratayasyāsti kutracit | | 12 | |

“An illusory mind is not produced by means of mantras and the like.” But there are different types of illusions, produced by different conditions. There is absolutely no single condition that brings about everything.

nirvṛtaḥ paramārthena saṁvṛtyā yadi saṁsaret |
buddho'pi saṁsaredevam tataḥ kiṁ bodhicaryayā | | 13 | |

“If one who is liberated because of ultimate reality still cycles through deceptive reality, then even a Buddha would still be in samsara. What would be the point of the bodhisattva’s way of life?”

pratayānāmanucchede māyāpyucchidyate na hi |
pratayānām tu vicchedātsaṁvṛtyāpi na saṁbhavaḥ | | 14 | |

As long as the conditions that sustain it are not eliminated illusion is not eliminated. But due to the elimination of the conditions even deceptive reality does not arise.

II. Critique of the Mind Only School

yadā na bhrāntirapyasti māyā kenopalabhyate | | 15 | |

“When even erroneous views do not exist, how will illusion be comprehended?”

yadā māyaiva te nāsti tadā kimupalabhyate |
cittasyaiva sa ākāro yadyapyanyo'sti tattvataḥ | | 16 | |

When according to you even illusion does not exist, what will be comprehended? Although it is thought to be just an aspect of the mind, it is other than that when it comes to how things really are.

cittameva yadā māyā tadā kiṁ kena dṛśyate |
uktaṁ ca lokanāthena cittaṁ cittaṁ na paśyati |
na cchinatti yathātmānamasidhārā tathā manaḥ | | 17 | |

“If the mind is illusory, then by what are things perceived?” The Protector of the World has said that mind does not perceive mind. The mind is just like the blade of a sword that does not cut itself.

ātmabhāvaṃ yathā dīpaḥ saṃprakāśayatīti cet |
naiva prakāśyate dīpo yasmāna tamasāvṛtaḥ | | 18 | |

“On the contrary: it’s just like a lamp that illuminates itself.” A lamp is not illuminated since it is not shrouded in darkness.

na hi sphaṭikavannīlaṃ nīlatve'nyamapekṣate |
tathā kimcītparāpekṣamanapekṣaṃ ca dṛśyate | | 19 | |

“A blue thing does not need something else in order to be blue, like a crystal does. So it is that things are perceived to be either dependent on another or not.”

anīlatve na tannīlaṃ nīlaheturyathekṣyate |
nīlameva hi ko nīlaṃ kuryādātmānamātmanā | | 20 | |

A blue thing is not to be regarded as the cause of the blueness of the blue thing, as it is in the case of something which is not blue. What blue thing would by itself make itself blue?

dīpaḥ prakāśata iti jñātvā jñānena kathyate |
buddhiḥ prakāśata iti jñātvedaṃ kena kathyate | | 21 | |

“One says, ‘The lamp illuminates,’ when one truly knows that. When one says, ‘The intellect illuminates,’ by what is this known?”

prakāśā vāprakāśā vā yadā dṛṣṭā na kenacit |
vandhyāduhitṛlīleva kathyamānāpi sā mudhā | | 22 | |

When the illumination or non-illumination is not perceived by anyone, talking about it is futile, like discussing the beauty of the daughter of a barren woman.

yadi nāsti svasaṃvittirvijñānaṃ smaryate katham |
anyānubhūte saṃbandhāt smṛtirākhuviṣaṃ yathā | | 23 | |

“If there is no apperception, how is consciousness recalled?” The recollection is due to drawing a connection when one has experienced something else, like the poison of a rat.

pratyayāntarayuktasya darśanātsvaṃ prakāśate |
siddhāñjanavidherdṛṣṭo ghaṭo naivāñjanam bhavet | | 25 | |

“It illuminates itself because of the perception that occurs when it is joined to different conditions.” A jar which appears due to the application of ointment to the eyes in a magical rite is not itself the ointment.

yathā dṛṣṭam śrutam jñātam naiveha pratiśidhyate |
satyataḥ kalpanā tvatra duḥkhaheturnivāryate | | 26 | |

It is not things that are seen, heard, and known that is being refuted here. It is the conceptualization of those things as truly existing – which is the cause of our suffering – that is here repudiated.

cittādanyā na māyā cennāpyananyeti kalpyate |
vastu cetsā katham nānyānanyā cennāsti vastutaḥ | | 27 | |

Illusion is regarded as neither different from the mind nor not different from the mind. But if it really exists, how could it not be different? And if it is not different, then it cannot really exist.

asatyapi yathā māyā dṛśyā draṣṭṛ tathā manaḥ |
vastvāśrayaścetsamsāraḥ so'nyathākāśavadbhavet | | 28 | |

Just as an illusion is visible even though it doesn't really exist, so it is with the observing mind. “But samsara depends on existing things. Otherwise it would be like empty space.”

vastvāśrayeṇābhāvasya kriyāvattvaṃ katham bhavet |
asatsahāyamekaṃ hi cittamāpadyate tava | | 29 | |

How could an existing thing do anything while based on a non-existing thing? This mind of yours would be reduced to something independent and isolated.

grāhyamuktaṃ yadā cittam tadā sarve tathāgatāḥ |
evaṃ ca ko guṇo labdhaścittamātre'pi kalpate | | 30 | |

If the subject mind was freed from objects, then everyone would be Buddhas. So what good is there in declaring that everything is “mind only?”

III. The Middle Way Position on Existence and Non-Existence

māyopamatve'pi jñāte katham kleśo nivartate |
yadā māyāstriyam rāgastatkarturapi jāyate | | 31 | |

“Even when we know that things are like illusions, how will a mental affliction be put to rest? Desire for an illusory woman arises even in the one who created her.”

aprahīṇā hi tatkarturjñeyasaṁkleśavāsanā |
taddṛṣṭikāle tasyāto durbalā śūnyavāsanā | | 32 | |

Because the creator’s habitual arising of mental afflictions towards objects of knowledge have not been eradicated, when he sees her the habit of thinking about the emptiness of things is weak.

śūnyatāvāsanādhānāddhīyate bhāvavāsanā |
kiṁcinnāstīti cābhyāsātsāpi paścātprahīyate | | 33 | |

Due to the strengthening of the habit of thinking about the emptiness of things, the habit of thinking things exist is eliminated. And because one has practiced thinking, “Nothing exists,” one later abandons even this idea.

yadā na labhyate bhāvo yo nāstīti prakalpyate |
tadā nirāśrayo'bhāvaḥ katham tiṣṭhenmateḥ puraḥ | | 34 | |

“If one asserts, ‘It does not exist,’ and there is no existing thing to perceive, then how could a non-existing thing, without any basis, stand before the mind?”

yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṁtiṣṭhate puraḥ |
tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati | | 35 | |

When neither an existing thing nor a non-existing thing stands before the mind, then since there is no other way to go, the mind, being without a foundation, comes to peace.

cintāmaṇiḥ kalpataruryathecchāparipūraṇaḥ |
vineyapraṇidhānābhyām jinabimban tathekṣyate | | 36 | |

Just as a wish-fulfilling gem or a wish-granting tree fulfills one’s wishes, so too is the image of the Conqueror regarded because of his vows and disciples.

yathā gāruḍikaḥ stambhaṁ sādhayitvā vinaśyati |
sa tasmimściranaṣṭe'pi viṣādīnupaśāmayet | | 37 | |

Just as when a dealer in antidotes dies having completed a pillar that can still neutralize poisons and the like long after his death. . .

bodhicaryānurūpyeṇa jinastambho'pi sādhiṭaḥ |
karoti sarvakāryāṇi bodhisattve'pi nirvṛte | | 38 | |

. . . so too does the pillar of the Conqueror, established in accordance with the bodhisattva's way of life, complete all tasks even when the bodhisattva has passed on into nirvana.

acittake kṛtā pūjā katham phalavati bhavet |
tulyaiva paṭhyate yasmāttiṣṭhato nirvṛtasya ca | | 39 | |

“How could worship of those who have gone beyond ordinary consciousness produce results?” Because it is taught that it is the same, regardless of whether the being is present or has passed on into nirvana.

āgamācca phalaṁ tatra saṁvṛtyā tattvato'pi vā |
satyabuddhe kṛtā pūjā saphaleti katham yathā | | 40 | |

According to authoritative sources, there is a result in that case no matter if it exists deceptively or truly, just as worship of a true Buddha has a result.

IV. Mahayana and Hinayana

satyadarśanato muktiḥ śūnyatādarśanena kim |
na vinānena mārgeṇa bodhiritiāgamo yataḥ | | 41 | |

“Liberation comes from seeing the Four Worthy Truths, so what's the point of seeing emptiness?” But according to the scripture, there is no enlightenment without this path.

nanvasiddham mahāyānaṁ katham siddhastvadāgamaḥ |
yasmādubhayasiddho'sau na siddho'sau tavāditaḥ | | 42 | |

“The Mahayana is certainly not substantiated.” How is your authoritative scripture substantiated? “Because we both agree that it is substantiated.” But you didn't so substantiate it from the the very start.

yatpratyayā ca tatrāsthā mahāyāne'pi tām kuru |
anyobhayeṣṭasatyatve vedāderapi satyatā | |43| |

When it comes to the Mahayana, you should give it the same consideration. If something is regarded as true when it is believed by both of the other parties, then even the Vedas and other texts are true.

savivādaṁ mahāyānamiti cedāgamaṁ tyaja |
tīrthikaiḥ savivādatvātsvaiḥ paraiścāgamāntaram | |44| |

If you say, "The Mahayana is controversial," then you should reject your own scriptures because they are controversial to non-Buddhists, and there are parts within the scriptures that are controversial even to your own people as well as to others.

Exercise for Class One

In verse 26 of the reading for this class, Shantideva states, "It is not things that are seen, heard, and known that is being refuted here. It is the conceptualization of those things as truly existing – which is the cause of our suffering – that is here repudiated."

On the basis of the verses covered in Class One, spend fifteen minutes a day this week in contemplation on why "deceptive reality" is depicted in the text as "illusory." What, exactly, is "illusory" about the world as it appears to us?

Chapter Nine, Entitled “The Perfection of Wisdom”

I. The Necessity of Realizing Emptiness for Awakening

śāsanam bhikṣutāmūlam bhikṣutaiva ca duḥsthitā |
sāvalambanacittānām nirvāṇamapi duḥsthitam | |45| |

The authoritative teachings have monkhood as their root, and monkhood alone is shaky ground. For those whose minds are still grasping, nirvana is also shaky ground.

kleśaprahāṇānmuktiścettadanantaramastu sā |
dṛṣṭam ca teṣu sāmartyam niṣkleśasyāpi karmaṇaḥ | |46| |

If liberation occurred because of the elimination of the mental afflictions, then it would happen immediately from that. But karma is seen even in those who are without mental afflictions.

trṣṇā tāvadupādānam nāsti cetsaṃpradhāryate |
kimakliṣṭāpi trṣṇaiṣām nāsti saṃmohavat satī | |47| |

If one contends that there is no grasping as long as there is no craving, then why is there no craving among those who still have delusions although free of mental afflictions?

vedanāpratyayā trṣṇā vedanaiṣām ca vidyate |
sālabanena cittena sthātavyam yatra tatra vā | |48| |

Craving is caused by feelings, and feelings are still found in such people whose minds dwell on mental objects of one kind or another.

vinā śūnyatayā cittam baddhamutpadyate punaḥ |
yathāsaṃjñīsamāpattau bhāvayettena śūnyatām | |49| |

Without emptiness the mind is imprisoned and arises again, as in the case of non-conceptual meditative states. And so one should meditate on emptiness.

saktitrāsāttvanirmuktyā saṃsāre sidhyati sthitiḥ |
mohena duḥkhiṇāmarthe śūnyatāyā idam phalam | |53| |

The result of meditating on emptiness is that one stays in samsara, liberated from clinging and fear, for the sake of those who are suffering due to delusion.

tadevaṃ śūnyatāpakṣe dūṣaṇaṃ nopapadyate |
tasmanñirvicikitsena bhāvanīyaiva śūnyatā | | 54 | |

So there is no possible refutation when it comes to emptiness. Therefore one should meditate on it exclusively and without any hesitation at all.

kleśajñeyāvṛtitamaḥpratipakṣo hi śūnyatā |
śīghraṃ sarvajñatākāmo na bhāvayati tām katham | | 55 | |

Emptiness is the antidote for the obstacles to omniscience and for the mental afflictions obstacles. Why wouldn't one who wants omniscience immediately meditate on it?

yadduḥkhajananaṃ vastu trāsastasmātprajāyatām |
śūnyatā duḥkhaśamanī tataḥ kiṃ jāyate bhayam | | 56 | |

Fear arises when one encounters something that produces suffering. Emptiness pacifies suffering, so what is there to fear from it?

II. The Emptiness of the Self

yatastato vāstu bhayaṃ yadyahaṃ nāma kiṃcana |
ahameva ca kiṃcicedbhayaṃ kasya bhaviṣyati | | 57 | |

If there was anything whatsoever we could call an "I," then fear could arise from any object. But if there is no self at all, who will there be who fears?

dantakeśanakhā nāhaṃ nāsthi nāpyasmi śoṇitam |
na siṅghāṇaṃ na ca śleṣmā na pūyaṃ lasikāpi vā | | 58 | |

The "I" is not the teeth, hair, nails, bone, blood, mucous, phlegm, pus, or lymph.

nāhaṃ vasā na ca svedo na medo'strāṇi nāpyahaṃ |
na cāhamantranirguṇḍī gūthamūtramahaṃ na ca | | 59 | |

The "I" is not the marrow, sweat, fat, or entrails; it is not the cavity of the entrails, the feces, or urine.

nāhaṃ māṃsaṃ na ca snāyu noṣmā vāyurahaṃ na ca |
na ca cchidrāṇyahaṃ nāpi ṣaḍ vijñānāni sarvathā | | 60 | |

The "I" is not the flesh, the ligaments, nor is it the heat or wind elements. It is not the bodily apertures nor the six consciousnesses.

śabdajñānaṃ yadi tadā śabdo gr̥hyeta sarvadā |
jñeyaṃ vinā tu kiṃ vetti yena jñānaṃ nirucyate | | 61 | |

If awareness of sound (were the “I”), then one would always be hearing. But without an object of knowledge, what does one know and in what sense could it be called an “awareness?”

ajānānaṃ yadi jñānaṃ kāṣṭhaṃ jñānaṃ prasajyate |
tenāsaṃnihitajñeyaṃ jñānaṃ nāstīti niścayaḥ | | 62 | |

If awareness were unknowing, then a stick would have it. Therefore it is certain that when there is no object of knowledge there is no awareness.

tadeva rūpaṃ jānāti tadā kiṃ na śṛṇotyapi |
śabdasyāsaṃnidhānācsettatastajñānamapyasat | | 63 | |

Why doesn’t one who is aware of form not also hear it? “Because if sound is not present, then there is no awareness of it.”

śabdagrahaṇarūpaṃ yattadrūpagrahaṇaṃ katham |
ekaḥ pitā ca putraśca kalpyate na tu tattvataḥ | | 64 | |

How could that which consists of the apprehension of sound also be that which apprehends form? The father might be imagined to be the same as the son, but it is not really true.

sattvaṃ rajastamo vāpi na putro na pitā yataḥ |
śabdagrahaṇayuktastu svabhāvastasya nekṣyate | | 65 | |

Just as purity, activity, and sluggishness are neither father nor son, so too is there is nothing with a self-nature adhering to that which apprehends sound.

tadevānyena rūpeṇa naṭavatso’pyaśāśvataḥ |
sa evānyasvabhāvaścedapūrveyaṃ tadekatā | | 66 | |

If it is like an actor, taking one guise and then another, then it is not permanent. If it really takes on another self-nature, then the so-called “oneness” of that (self) is really quite extraordinary!

anyadrūpamasatyam cennijam tadrūpamucyatām |
jñānatā cettataḥ sarvapumsāmaikyaṁ prasajyate | | 67 | |

If another guise is not the true one, then say what the innate form is! If you say it's awareness, then it follows that all humans are exactly alike.

cetanācetane caikyaṁ tayoryenāstitā samā |
viśeṣaśca yadā mithyā kaḥ sādṛśyāśrayastadā | | 68 | |

That which has volition and that which does not have volition would be identical because they would have the same reality. If difference is false, then what would be the grounds for saying there was similarity?

acetanaśca naivāhamācaitanyātpaṭādivat |
atha jñāścetanāyogādajño naṣṭaḥ prasajyate | | 69 | |

That which is without consciousness is not the "I" – if it were, then it would be something like cloth, which is also without consciousness. And if it were something that had consciousness, then it would follow that when it was unlinked from the object of consciousness it would be cease to be.

athāvikṛta evātmā caitanyenāsyā kim kṛtam |
ajñāsyā niṣkriyasyaivamākāśasyātmatā matā | | 70 | |

If the self is unchanging, what could its consciousness be conscious of? If such were possible, then even empty space – which is without a consciousness and doesn't do anything at all – could be said to have a "self."

na karmaphalasambandho yuktaścedātmanā vinā |
karma kṛtvā vinaṣṭe hi phalaṁ kasya bhaviṣyati | | 71 | |

"But without a self there is nothing that joins the act and the consequence of the act. If the actor is destroyed when he or she has completed the act, then for whom will there be a consequence?"

dvayorapyāvayoḥ siddhe bhinnādhāre kriyāphale |
nirvyāpāraśca tatrātmetyatra vādo vṛthā nanu | | 72 | |

When we two have agreed that there are different bases for the act and for the consequence, and that the self has nothing to do with it, speaking about it is really useless.

hetumān phalayogīti dr̥śyate naiṣa saṁbhavaḥ |
saṁtānasyaikyamāśritya kartā bhokteti deśitam | |73| |

It is apparent that the one who creates the cause and the one who experiences the result do not exist at the same time. It has been demonstrated that the agent and the recipient are linked by a unity of the continuum.

atītānāgataṁ cittaṁ nāhaṁ taddhi na vidyate |
athotpannamahaṁ cittaṁ naṣṭe'sminnāstyahaṁ punaḥ | |74| |

The "I" is not the mind of the past nor of the future, since neither exist. If the "I" were the present mind, then when the present mind ceased to be, the "I" would no longer exist.

yathaiva kadalistambho na kaścidbhāgaśaḥ kṛtaḥ |
tathāhamapyasadbhūto mṛgyamāṇo vicārataḥ | |75| |

Just as there is nothing inside when you cut into the trunk of a banana tree, so too when you go looking systematically for the "I" there is nothing that exists.

yadi sattvo na vidyeta kasyopari kṛpeti cet |
kāryārthamabhyupetena yo mohena prakalpitaḥ | |76| |

"If there is no living being, for whom will we have compassion?" It is for the one we imagine because of our delusion and accept for the sake of the work to be done.

kāryaṁ kasya na cetsattvaḥ satyamīhā tu mohataḥ |
duḥkhavyupaśamārthaṁ tu kāryamoho na vāryate | |77| |

"But if there are no living beings, whose work is it?" It is true that the effort is also characterized by delusion. But delusion, when it comes to work done for the purpose of the cessation of suffering, should not cease.

duḥkhaheturahaṁkāra ātmamohāttu vardhate |
tato'pi na nivartyaścet varaṁ nairātmyabhāvanā | |78| |

But if the ego, which is the cause of suffering, enlarges because of the delusion of a self then, so as not to have that happen, a meditation on no-self is best.

Exercise for Class Two

This section of the text deals with the emptiness of the self. Carve out some time each day this week to review the arguments for why an “I” cannot be found in the physical body and the awareness of the data the sense organs relay. Then review the subsequent arguments for why the self cannot be unitary and unchanging, and cannot be found in the past, future, or even in the present.

Chapter Nine, Entitled “The Perfection of Wisdom”

I. The Emptiness of Things Like the Body

kāyo na pādaḥ na jaṅghā norū kāyaḥ kaṭirna ca |
nodaraṃ nāpyayaṃ pṛṣṭhaṃ noro bāhū na cāpi saḥ | 79 | |

The body is not the feet, the calves, the thighs, or the hips. It is not the belly, back, chest, or arms.

na hastau nāpyayaṃ pārśvau na kakṣau nāmsalakṣaṇaḥ |
na grīvā na śiraḥ kāyaḥ kāyo'tra katarāḥ punaḥ | 80 | |

It is not the hands, the ribs, or the arm pits, and it is not the shoulders. The body is not the neck nor the head. So where is the body?

yadi sarveṣu kāyo'yamekadeśena vartate |
amśā amśeṣu vartante sa ca kutra svayaṃ sthitaḥ | 81 | |

If the body exists partially in all (of the parts), and the parts exist in the parts, where is that which stands by itself?

sarvātmanā cetsarvatra sthitaḥ kāyaḥ karādiṣu |
kāyāstāvanta eva syuryāvantaste karādayaḥ | 82 | |

If the body was fully present in its entirety in the hands and so forth, then there would be as many bodies as there are hands and the rest.

naivāntarna bahiḥ kāyaḥ kathaṃ kāyaḥ karādiṣu |
karādibhyaḥ pṛthaṃ nāsti kathaṃ nu khalu vidyate | 83 | |

The body is not inside nor is it outside. How could the body be in the hands and the rest? But it also cannot be separate from the hands, etc. How can it be at all?

tannāsti kāyo mohātu kāyabuddhiḥ karādiṣu |
saṃniveśaviśeṣeṇa sthāṇau puruṣabuddhivat | 84 | |

There is no body. But because of delusion there is the idea of a body somewhere among the hands and the rest due to the particular arrangement of the parts. It is like thinking a pillar is a person.

yāvatpratayayasāmagrī tāvatkāyaḥ pumāniva |
evam karādaḥ sā yāvattāvatkāyo'tra dr̥śyate | | 85 | |

As long as the assembly of conditions last, the body appears as a person. Similarly, as long that assembly of hands and the rest last, the body can be seen in them.

evamaṅgulipuñjatvātpādo'pi kataro bhavet |
so'pi parvasamūhatvāt parvāpi svāmśabhedataḥ | | 86 | |

So too there is a foot because of all the toes, but which one is the foot? And a toe is made possible by the collection of joints, and a joint is made possible by the subdivision into its own parts.

aṁśā apyaṅubhedena so'pyaṅurdigvibhāgataḥ |
digvibhāgo niraṁśatvādākāśaṁ tena nāstyāṅuḥ | | 87 | |

The parts exist because of the subdivision into atoms, and an atom also depends on its subdivision into the directions. The subdivision of the directions depends on empty space because of its absence of parts. Therefore there is no atom.

evam svapnopame rūpe ko rajyeta vicārakaḥ |
kāyaścaivam yadā nāsti tadā kā strī pumāmśca kaḥ | | 88 | |

**What discerning person would be attracted by form, which is just like a dream?
When there is no body at all, who is a woman and who is a man?**

II. The Emptiness of Feelings

yadyasti duḥkhaṁ tattvena prahṛṣṭān kim na bādhatē |
śokādyārtāya mr̥ṣṭādi sukhaṁ cetkim na rocate | | 89 | |

If suffering truly exists, why doesn't it bother those who are joyful? If pleasant things are inherently joyful, why don't they please those who are grief stricken and such?

balīyasābhibhūtadvādyadi tannānubhūyate |
vedanātvam katham tasya yasya nānubhavātmatā | | 90 | |

If it is not noticed because it is overpowered by something stronger, how can it be a feeling when it is not something felt?

asti sūkṣmatayā duḥkhaṁ sthaulyaṁ tasya hṛtaṁ nanu |
tuṣṭimātrāparā cetsyāttasmāt sāpyasya sūkṣmatā | | 91 | |

“Surely when the gross form of suffering is removed there is a subtle form of it.” If it is simply another form of pleasure, then that subtle feeling is a version of it.

viruddhapratyayotpattau duḥkhasyānudayo yadi |
kalpanābhiniveśo hi vedanetyāgataṁ nanu | | 92 | |

If suffering doesn't arise when the conditions for its opposite have arisen, then surely what arises as what we call “a feeling” is brought about by the imagination.

ata eva vicāro'yaṁ pratipakṣo'sya bhāvyate |
vikalpakṣetrasambhūtadhyānāhārā hi yoginaḥ | | 93 | |

And so this analysis is put forth as an antidote to it. Meditations that arise from the arena of contemplation are nourishment for practitioners.

sāntarāvindriyārthau cetsaṁsargaḥ kuta etayoḥ |
nirantaratve'pyekatvaṁ kasya kenāstu saṁgatiḥ | | 94 | |

If there is a space between the sense powers and their objects, then where is the connection between the two of them? And if there is no space between them, then they would be one and the same thing; what would join together with what?

nāṇoraṇau praveśo'sti nirākāśaḥ samaśca saḥ |
apraveśe na miśratvamamiśratve na saṁgatiḥ | | 95 | |

One atom does not penetrate another, for that which is without space in between is one and the same thing. When there is no penetration there is no mixing, and without mixing there is no joining together.

niraṁśasya ca saṁsargaḥ kathaṁ nāmopapadyate |
saṁsarge ca niraṁśatvaṁ yadi dṛṣṭaṁ nidarśaya | | 96 | |

And how could it be called a commingling when there are no parts? If there are no parts observable between things when they are commingled, then demonstrate this!

vijñānasya tvamūrtasya saṁsargo naiva yujyate |
samūhasyāpyavastutvādyathā pūrvam vicāritam | |97| |

It is not correct to speak of a commingling of (a material thing) with consciousness that has no material form, nor with an aggregate because it is not an existing thing, as we have shown previously.

tadevam sparśanābhāve vedanāsambhavaḥ kutaḥ |
kimarthamayamāyāsaḥ bādha kasya kuto bhavet | |98| |

Therefore, since there is nothing in contact, how can a feeling arise? What's the point of getting all worked up over this? By what could what be injured?

yadā na vedakaḥ kaścidvedanā ca na vidyate |
tadāvasthāmimāṁ dṛṣṭvā tṛṣṇe kiṁ na vidīryase | |99| |

Since one who feels does not exist, and a feeling cannot be located anywhere at all, then why do you not destroy craving when it arises if you have seen that this is the case?

dṛśyate spr̥śyate cāpi svapnamāyopamātmanā |
cittena sahajātattvādvedanā tena nekṣyate | |100| |

The self that sees and touches is only like a dream or an illusion. Since feeling arises simultaneously with the mind, it is not perceived by the mind.

pūrvam paścācca jātena smaryate nānubhūyate |
svātmānam nānubhavati na cānyenānubhūyate | |101| |

Because it happens at the same time, it is not experienced; what happened earlier is remembered later. It does not experience itself and it is not experienced by anything other.

na cāsti vedakaḥ kaścidvedanāto na tattvataḥ |
nirātmake kalāpe'smin ka evam bādhyate'nayā | |102| |

There is no one who feels and there is no real feeling at all. In this jumble of things that have no essences, what is injured by another?

III. The Emptiness of the Mind

nendriyeṣu na rūpādau nāntarāle manaḥ sthitam |
nāpyantarna bahiścittamanyatrāpi na labhyate | | 103 | |

The mind is not located within the sense powers, nor is it in things that have form and the rest (of the five heaps), nor is it somewhere in between. It is not found inside or outside or anywhere else.

yanna kāye na cānyatra na miśraṁ na pṛthak kvacit |
tanna kimcidataḥ sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ | | 104 | |

That which is neither in the body nor anywhere else, which is neither mixed up with something else nor separate from it – that is nothing at all. And so it is that living beings are by nature completely liberated!

jñeyātpūrvam yadi jñānam kimālambyāsyā sambhavaḥ |
jñeyena saha cejjñānam kimālambyāsyā sambhavaḥ | | 105 | |

**If the capacity to know exists before that which is known, on what basis does it arise?
If the capacity to know exists at the same time as that which is known, on what basis does it arise?**

atha jñeyādbhavet paścāt tadā jñānam kuto bhavet |
evam ca sarvadharmāṇāmutpattirnāvasiyate | | 106 | |

And if the capacity to know occurred after that which is known, then what would the capacity to know know? So it is that the arising of all things cannot be ascertained.

IV. Interdependence

yadyevam samvṛtirnāsti tataḥ satyadvayaṁ kutaḥ |
atha sāpyanyasamvṛtyā syātsattvo nirvṛtaḥ kutaḥ | | 107 | |

“If there is no deceptive reality, then how can there be two kinds of truth about reality? And if it exists because because of some other deceptive reality, then how could living beings ever be liberated?”

paracittavikalpo'sau svasamvṛtyā tu nāsti saḥ |
sa paścānniyataḥ so'sti na cennāstyeva samvṛtiḥ | | 108 | |

That is a projection of another mind; it does not exist because of one's own deceptive reality. After it is ascertained, it exists. And if it is not ascertained, it doesn't exist, even in deceptive reality.

kalpanā kalpitaṁ ceti dvayamanyonyaniśritam |
yathāprasiddhamāśritya vicāraḥ sarva ucyate | | 109 | |

The two – conceptualization and what is conceptualized – are mutually interdependent. All analysis is expressed by taking recourse in common sense.

vicāritena tu yadā vicāreṇa vicāryate |
tadānavasthā tasyāpi vicārasya vicāraṇāt | | 110 | |

“But if one analyzes with an analysis which has already been analyzed, and then there is an analysis of that analysis, there is infinite regress.”

vicārite vicārye tu vicārasyāsti nāśrayaḥ |
nirāśritatvānnodeti tacca nirvāṇamucyate | | 111 | |

When one analyzes what has been analyzed, there is no basis of the analysis. And because there is no basis there is no arising, and that is what's called “nirvana.”

yasya tvetaddūyaṁ satyaṁ sa evātyantaduḥsthiṭaḥ |
yadi jñeyavaśādartha jñānāstitve tu kā gatiḥ | | 112 | |

Those who maintain that both truly exist are standing on shaky ground. If an object exists due to the power of it being knowable, how do we arrive at the true existence of the capacity to know?

atha jñeyavaśājjñānaṁ jñeyāstitve tu kā gatiḥ |
athānyonyavaśātsattvamabhāvaḥ syāddūyorapi | | 113 | |

And if the capacity to know exists due to the knowable thing, how do we arrive at the true existence of the knowable thing? And if each exists due to the power of the other, then there is no true existence for either of the two.

pitā cenna vinā putrātkutaḥ putrasya sambhavaḥ |
putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathāsattvaṁ tayordvayoḥ | | 114 | |

“Without a father there is no son; where would the son come from?” And without a son there is no father. In the same way, these two do not truly exist.

aṅkuro jāyate bijādbijaṁ tenaiva sūcyate |
jñeyājñānena jātena tatsattā kiṁ na gamyate | | 115 | |

“A sprout arises from a seed, and because of the seed the sprout manifests. The capacity to know arises because of that which is knowable, so why can’t we conclude that it truly exists?”

aṅkurādanyato jñānādbijamastīti gamyate |
jñānāstitvaṁ kuto jñātaṁ jñeyaṁ yattena gamyate | | 116 | |

A seed exists due to a capacity to know that is different from that which knows the sprout. When knowing the capacity to know means it becomes a knowable thing, how can that capacity to know truly exist?

V. The Emptiness of Causation

lokaḥ pratyakṣatastāvatsarvaṁ hetumudikṣate |
padmanālādibhedo hi hetubhedena jāyate | | 117 | |

Worldly people observe, with direct perception, all kinds of causes. The various parts of a lotus – its stalk and the rest – arise due to various causes.

kiṁkṛto hetubhedaścet pūrvahetuprabhedataḥ |
kasmāccepthalado hetuḥ pūrvahetuprabhāvataḥ | | 118 | |

And what produces this variety of causes? The variety of causes previous to them. And why does a cause bring about its effect? Because of the existence of previous causes.

īśvaro jagato hetuḥ vada kastāvadiśvaraḥ |
bhūtāni cedbhavatvevaṁ nāmamātre'pi kiṁ śramaḥ | | 119 | |

“God is the cause of this whole world.” Explain who God is exactly! If He is just the elements, then why quibble over words?

api tvaneke'nityāśca niśceṣṭā na ca devatāḥ |
laṅghyāścāśucayaścaiva kṣmādayo na sa īśvaraḥ | | 120 | |

Furthermore, the elements – earth and the rest – are multiple, impermanent, powerless, and are not divine. They can be stepped on and are impure. This is no God!

nākāśamīśo'ceṣṭatvāt nātmā pūrvaniṣedhataḥ |
acintyasya ca karṭṛtvamapyacintyaṁ kimucyate | | 121 | |

Empty space is not the Lord either, for it is powerless. And He is not the self, as we have proven above. How can the Inconceivable One's inconceivable ability to act ever be described?

tena kiṁ sraṣṭumiṣṭaṁ ca ātmā cet nanvasau dhruvaḥ |
kṣmādisvabhāva īśaśca jñānaṁ jñeyādanādi ca | | 122 | |

What would He wish to create? If it were a self, then surely it, the elements, and the Lord would all have a permanent self-nature. The capacity to know is due to a knowable thing and is without a beginning.

karmaṇaḥ sukhaduḥkhe ca vada kiṁ tena nirmitam |
hetorādirna cedasti phalasyādiḥ kuto bhavet | | 123 | |

Happiness and suffering come from karma. Tell me, what is created by this (God)? If there is no beginning to causes, how can there be a beginning to results?

kasmātsadā na kurute na hi so'nyamapekṣate |
tenākṛto'nyo nāstyeva tenāsau kimapekṣatām | | 124 | |

If He does not depend on something else, why is He not perpetually creating? If there is nothing not made by Him, on what would He depend?

apekṣate cetsāmagrīṁ heturna punarīśvaraḥ |
nākartumīśaḥ sāmagryām [na kartuṁ tadabhāvataḥ] | | 125 | |

If He depends on a collection (of causes), then again the Lord cannot be the (single) cause. The Lord cannot create when the collection (of causes) are present, and when they are not present He cannot create.

karotyanicchannīśaścetparāyattaḥ prasajyate |
icchannapīchāyattaḥ syāt kurvataḥ kuta īsatā | |126| |

If the Lord creates without desiring to do so, then it follows that He does so dependently on something other than Himself. And if He desires to create, then He depends on desire. Where is the lordship of the Lord?

Exercise for Class Three

Among the topics covered in this section of the text is the emptiness of feelings.

Every day this week, stop for a few moments and observe whatever feeling is dominant at the moment – happiness, sadness, anxiety, fear, or whatever. Just get in touch with it and observe it. Does it seem to have some kind of persuasive fixity? Keep watching it until you notice it changing into another sort of feeling, recalling the verses covered in this class on the impermanence of what we label “feelings.”

Chapter Nine, Entitled "The Perfection of Wisdom"

I. Causation, God, and the World of Nature

ye'pi nityānaṇūnāhuste'pi pūrvam nivāritāḥ |
sāmkhyāḥ pradhānamicchanti nityam lokasya kāraṇam | | 127 | |

Those who say that atoms are permanent we have already refuted. The Samkhyas regard the Primal One as the permanent cause of the universe.

sattvam rajastamaśceti guṇā viṣamasthitāḥ |
pradhānamiti kathyante viṣamairjagaducyate | | 128 | |

The constituents – purity, activity, and sluggishness – remaining in equilibrium are what is called the Primal One. The world is said to come about because of their disequilibrium.

ekasya trisvabhāvatvamayuktaṁ tena nāsti tat |
evam guṇā na vidyante pratyekaṁ te'pi hi tridhā | | 129 | |

It makes no sense to attribute three self-natures to any one thing, and so that (Primal One) does not exist. And there are no constituents, because each one would have to be threefold.

guṇābhāve ca śabdāderastitvamatidūrataḥ |
acetane ca vastrādaḥ sukhāderapyasambhavaḥ | | 130 | |

And if the constituents do not exist, then the existence of sound and the rest (of the objects of the senses) is unlikely. And there cannot be happiness, etc., in things like cloth that do not have minds.

taddheturūpā bhāvāścennanu bhāvā vicāritāḥ |
sukhādyeva ca te hetuḥ na ca tasmātpaṭādayaḥ | | 131 | |

If you argue that existing things are really just causes, then haven't you analyzed away existing things? For you, happiness and the rest are causes, but (objects of the senses) like cloth do not derive from them.

II. The Impermanence of Feelings

paṭādestu sukhādi syāttadabhāvātsukhādyasat |
sukhādīnām ca nityatvaṁ kadācinnopalabhyate | | 132 | |

If happiness and the rest (of the feelings) derived from (insentient) things like cloth, then were they not present happiness, etc., also would not exist. Happiness and the rest (of the feelings) are never perceived to be permanent.

satyāmeva sukhavyaktau saṁvittiḥ kiṁ na gṛhyate |
tadeva sūkṣmatām yāti sthūlam sūkṣmaṁ ca tatkatham | | 133 | |

If the manifestation of happiness truly existed, then why is the feeling of happiness not always felt? You might say, "It becomes subtle," but how can it be both gross and subtle at the same time?

sthaulyaṁ tyaktvā bhavetsūkṣmamanitye sthaulyasūkṣmate |
sarvasya vastunastadvatkiṁ nānityatvamiṣyate | | 134 | |

"When it leaves its gross state it becomes subtle. Grossness and subtlety are impermanent." So why not consider everything as impermanent in just the same way?

na sthaulyaṁ cetsukhādanyat sukhasyānityatā sphuṭam |
nāsadutpadyate kiṁcidasattvāditi cenmatam |
vyaktasyāsata utpattirakāmasyāpi te sthitā | | 135 | |

If happiness is a gross state, then it is certainly impermanent. If you believe that there can be no arising whatsoever of what does not already truly exist, you still have the unintended problem of the arising of the manifestation of something that does not truly exist.

III. Valid Perception

annādo'medhyabhakṣaḥ syāt phalaṁ hetau yadi sthitam |
paṭārgheṇaiva karpāsabījaṁ krītvā nivasyatām | | 136 | |

If the effect is present in the cause, then the eating of food would be the eating of excrement and for the price of cloth you could buy cotton seeds and wear them.

mohāccennekṣate lokaḥ tattvajñasyāpi sā sthitiḥ | | 137 | |

While the worldly do not perceive this, it is also the case that those who know how things really are don't either.

lokasyāpi ca tajjñānamasti kasmāna paśyati |
lokāpramāṇatāyām cet vyaktadarśanamapyasat | | 138 | |

Everyone in the world knows this! So why don't they see (your point of view)? If you say it is because the worldly lack valid perception, then even seeing things that are manifest must also be false.

pramāṇamapramāṇam cennanu tatpramitaṁ mṛṣā |
tattvataḥ śūnyatā tasmādbhāvānām nopapadyate | | 139 | |

"If valid perception is invalid, then what is validated by it is false. Therefore, in reality, the emptiness of phenomena is impossible."

kalpitaṁ bhāvamasprṣtvā tadabhāvo na gṛhyate |
tasmādbhāvo mṛṣā yo hi tasyābhāvaḥ sphuṭaṁ mṛṣā | | 140 | |

If you don't apprehend an imaginary thing, you can't apprehend a non-existent thing. And so when an existing thing is thought of wrongly, its non-existence is also apprehended wrongly.

IV. Things Have Only a Dream-like Existence

tasmātsvapne sute naṣṭe sa nāstīti vikalpanā |
tadbhāvakalpanotpādaṁ vibadhnāti mṛṣā ca sā | | 141 | |

And so when in a dream one's child is killed, one imagines, "He or she is no more." That which is mistakenly imagined blocks the arising of the thought that he or she actually exists.

tasmādevaṁ vicāreṇa nāsti kimcidahetutaḥ |
na ca vyastasamasteṣu pratyayeṣu vyavasthitam | | 142 | |

Therefore, through this analysis we see that there is nothing whatsoever that is without a cause, and nothing is contained within the conditions, either separately or taken as a whole.

anyato nāpi cāyātām na tiṣṭhati na gacchati |
māyātaḥ ko viśeṣo'sya yanmūḍhaiḥ satyataḥ kṛtam | | 143 | |

Nothing comes from something else; nothing stays the same; nothing departs. What difference is there between that which is illusory and that which fools take to be real?

māyayā nirmitam yacca hetubhiryacca nirmitam |
āyāti tatkutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām | | 144 | |

That which is created by magic and that which is created by causes – think about it! Where does it come from and where does it go?

yadanyasāmnidhānena dṛṣṭam na tadabhāvataḥ |
pratibimbasame tasmin kṛtrime satyatā katham | | 145 | |

That which appears only when it comes into the presence of something else, and does not appear when that something else does not exist – how can there be true existence in that which is artificial, like a reflection in a mirror?

vidyamānasya bhāvasya hetunā kiṁ prayojanam |
athāpyavidyamāno'sau hetunā kiṁ prayojanam | | 146 | |

If something exists, what need is there for a cause? And if something doesn't exist, what need is there for a cause?

nābhāvasya vikāro'sti hetukoṭīśatairapi |
tadavastha katham bhāvaḥ ko vānyo bhāvatām gataḥ | | 147 | |

Even with ten million causes, you can't transform a non-existing thing (into an existing thing). How could something like that (a non-existing thing) become an existing thing? And what else is there that could become an existing thing (except for a non-existing thing)?

nābhāvakāle bhāvaścetakadā bhāvo bhaviṣyati |
nājātena hi bhāvena so'bhāvo'pagamiṣyati | | 148 | |

If no existing thing exists at the time when it is non-existent, when would it become an existing thing? The non-existing thing will not disappear if the existing thing is not brought into existence.

na cānapagate'bhāve bhāvāvasarasambhavaḥ |
bhāvaścābhāvatām naiti dvisvabhāvaprasaṅgataḥ | | 149 | |

And if a non-existent thing has not disappeared, there is no possibility of an existing thing taking its place. An existing thing does not become a non-existing thing, for if it did it would follow that it could have two different self-natures.

evam na ca nirodho'sti na ca bhāvo'sti sarvadā |
ajātamaniruddham ca tasmātsarvamidaṁ jagat | | 150 | |

Thus, there is never any cessation nor any becoming. Therefore this whole world is neither produced nor does it cease.

svapnopamāstu gatayo vicāre kadalisaṁhāḥ |
nirvṛtānirvṛtānām ca viśeṣo nāsti vastutaḥ | | 151 | |

States of existence are like dreams; upon analysis they're the same as a banana tree. In reality, there's no difference between those in nirvana and those who aren't.

evam śūnyeṣu dharmeṣu kiṁ labdham kiṁ hṛtam bhavet |
satkṛtaḥ paribhūto vā kena kaḥ sambhaviṣyati | | 152 | |

Thus, when everything is empty, what is there to gain or lose? Who is there to be honored or villified, and by whom?

kutaḥ sukham vā duḥkham vā kiṁ priyam vā kimapriyam |
kā tṛṣṇā kutra sā tṛṣṇā mṛgyamāṇā svabhāvataḥ | | 153 | |

Where do happiness and suffering come from? What is there that is likeable or dislikeable? When we look for their self-natures, what is craving and for what is there craving?

vicāre jīvalokaḥ kaḥ ko nāmātra mariṣyati |
ko bhaviṣyati ko bhūtaḥ ko bandhuḥ kasya kaḥ suhṛt | | 154 | |

Upon analysis, what is this world of living beings? Who really dies here? Who will come into existence, and who has already come into existence? Who is a relative? Who is friend to whom?

V. Emptiness and Compassion

sarvamākāśasaṁkāśaṁ parigrhṇantu madvidhāḥ |
prakupyanti prahr̥ṣyanti kalahotsavahetubhiḥ | | 155 | |

May those who are like me understand that everything is like empty space. (Others) become enraged by quarrels and are elated when there are festivals.

śokāyāsairviśādaiśca mithaśchedanabhedanaiḥ |
yāpayanti sukṛcchreṇa pāpairātmasukhecchavaḥ | | 156 | |

Seeking happiness only for themselves, they do bad things and live with great difficulty – with grief and troubles, depression, cutting and stabbing each other.

mṛtāḥ patantyapāyeṣu dīrghatīvrvyatheṣu ca |
āgatyaḥ sugatim bhūtvā bhūtvā sukhocitāḥ | | 157 | |

After repeated good births in which they become accustomed to pleasure, the deceased fall into bad states where the pain is intense and long-lasting.

bhave bahuprapātaśca tatra cātattvamīdṛśam |
tatrānyonyavirodhaśca na bhavettattvamīdṛśam | | 158 | |

There are many pitfalls in worldly existence; nothing like how things really are is found there. There is only conflict with one another there. In worldly existence, there is nothing like how things really are.

tatra cānupamāstīvrā anantā duḥkhasāgarāḥ |
tatraivamalpabalatā tatrāpyalpatvamāyusaḥ | | 159 | |

And there are boundless oceans of incomparable and intense suffering. There is thus not much strength and very short lifespans.

tatrāpi jīvitārogyavyāpāreih kṣutklamaśramaiḥ |
nidrayopadravairbālasaṁsargairniṣphalaistathā | | 160 | |

There too people are just preoccupied with staying alive and healthy and life is characterized by hunger, fatigue, weariness, exhaustion, sleep, calamities, and unprofitable associations with fools.

vṛthaiṅvāyurvahatyāśu vivekastatra durlabhaḥ |
tatrāpyabhyastavikṣepanivāraṇagatiḥ kutaḥ | | 161 | |

Life passes by quickly and people live in vain. Discrimination is difficult to obtain there. How could there be a way to prevent habitual distractions in such a place?

tatrāpi māro yatate mahāpāyaprapātane |
tatrāsanmārgabāhulyādvicikitsā ca durjayā | | 162 | |

There also Mara casts people into great misfortunes. And there, because of the multitude of false paths, doubt is difficult to conquer.

punaśca kṣaṇadaurlabhyaṁ buddhotpādo'tidurlabhaḥ |
kleśaugho durnivāraścetyaho duḥkhaparamparā | | 163 | |

Such an opportunity is difficult to obtain again, and the appearance of a Buddha is extremely difficult to obtain. The torrent of mental afflictions is hard to keep at bay. Oh what a parade of suffering!

aho batātiśocyatvameṣāṁ duḥkhaughavartinām |
ye nekṣante svadauḥsthityamevamapyatiduḥsthitāḥ | | 164 | |

Alas, the condition of those drowning in this flood of suffering is so lamentable! Even though they are in very bad shape, they don't even perceive it!

snātvā snātvā yathā kaścidviśedvahnim muhurmuḥ |
svasausthityaṁ ca manyante evamapyatiduḥsthitāḥ | | 165 | |

Like people who repeatedly douse themselves only to be again and again thrown into the fire, they are in a very bad situation but regard themselves as living in an auspicious condition.

ajarāmaralīlānāmevaṁ viharatām satām |
āyāsyantyāpado ghorāḥ kṛtvā maraṇamagrataḥ | | 166 | |

Going about their business like this, pretending they are immune from old age and death, terrible calamities befall them, especially death.

evaṁ duḥkhāgnitaptānām śāntim kuryāmahaṁ kadā |
puṇyameghasamudbhūtaiḥ sukhopakaraṇaiḥ svakaiḥ | | 167 | |

When might I relieve those tormented by the fire of suffering utilizing the instruments coming from the clouds of merit that bring happiness?

kadopalambhadṛṣṭibhyo deśayiṣyāmi śūnyatām |
saṁvṛtyānupalambhena puṇyasambhāramādarāt | | 168 | |

When will I effectively teach emptiness and the accumulation of merit that comes from non-attachment to deceptive reality to those who are attached to their own views?

Exercise for Class Four

Shantideva argues that things have only a “dream-like” existence and that causation cannot work the way we ordinarily think it does.

Review the arguments for these statements this week. What are the logical problems with causation as it is normally regarded? What kind of causation occurs in our experience of dreaming? Does calling existence “dream-like” mean it doesn’t function or work to bring us pain or pleasure, suffering or happiness?